Human rights are normally understood to reflect a universal global morality requiring obligations to all humanity—the natural rights of all people, in all situations, and not to be withheld. In practice, this principle is not universally recognised throughout the non-ideal world, and never has been. Its abuse and partiality can undermine the sovereignty and cultural hegemony of the nation-states of the West, because multiculturalism can be acquired by strictly conforming to the “oughts” required by unqualified universal claim rights. It may, though, be argued that a nation-state, whilst rigorously maintaining the human rights of its own citizens, should not be duty or morally obligated, let alone capable of, attempting to enforce these rights outside of its own territory. Nor, in having regard to its own national interest, should it be obligated to harbour illegitimate asylum seekers claiming rights violation in their country of origin. A further contention is that some of the universal claim rights seemingly acceptable fifty or so years ago at the time of the UN Conventions are now outmoded, and should no longer be regarded as absolute and unchangeable—at least insofar as they give support to the unqualified and effectively unverifiable claims of migrants. These Conventions need to be revised to update their relevance and legitimacy in the changed circumstances of the millennium. Arendt [1958:279] observed that “no paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists, who stubbornly insist on regarding as ‘inalienable’ those human rights, which are enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civilised countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves.”