ABSTRACT
The last two chapters have shown us that the current psychological view of instincts is not in harmony with the experimental findings of the behaviorist. Can the case for the present conception of emotions be made out any better? Probably no subject, unless it be that of instinct, has been more written about than emotions. Indeed the awe-inspiring number of volumes and papers and journals produced by Freudians and post-Freudians in the last 20 years would fill a good-sized room. And yet the behaviorist, as he reads through this great mass of literature cannot but feel in it a lack of any central scientific viewpoint. Not until his own genetic studies, started less than 10 years ago, began to bear fruit, did it become apparent to the behaviorist that he could simplify the problems of emotion and apply objective experimental methods to their solution. Since most of you have been brought up on James’ “theory” of the emotions, let us start with him. Pointing out the weakness of his position will be the easiest way to convince you that the behaviorist has something genuine to contribute both on methods and in results.
