The argument so far has been that with privatization there must inevitably be fuller specification of outputs. These will be negotiated between the agency and the contractor and be reflected in the contract. Performance can then be measured against something more tangible than is the case with the input-orientated systems historically exemplified by public sector prisons. The substantive terms of the contract are thus crucial. Contract compliance is a central element of accountability. It follows from this that the less prescriptive the contract is, the looser will be the accountability which it underpins, and vice versa. For example, the Junee contract provides with regard to education that ‘the Correctional Centre is to provide access to, and encourage offenders to undertake, a range of educational and vocational programs’. This is exactly the kind of non-prescriptive obligation that an input-orientated organization might impose upon itself. But dealing with a private sector company which needs to know exactly what is expected of it, this clause led to several major disagreements (at last resolved) between the parties (Downes 1994; Sneddon 1995). Donahue (1989:82) puts the proposition as follows: ‘the fundamental distinction is between competitive output-based relationships and non-competitive input-based relationships rather than between profit seekers and civil servants per se’.