It is clear from public and academic debates that democracy is challenged, both in terms of its theory and practice. Disenchantment and discontent is commonplace, and there are many questions asked why this is occurring: Why do people not want to recognize the validity of the democratic process? Concurrently, there is also a tendency, as I have described throughout this book, to consider some political subjects are inferior to others. Interestingly, those political subjects are often labelled as such due to their emotional or affective character, whether it is the voter for a populist party, or a participant in an occupation of a square. Both of them are often considered as less valid, and as incapable of partaking in proper public debates. This raises questions around what type of subject is valid in a democracy, and how it should be constituted. This book has proposed a revisited outlook on political subjectivity, with a specific focus on emotions and affect. The hierarchies between political subjects are often difficult to place along the lines of organization, ideology, or age, and there is a need to turn our gaze elsewhere. I have argued that much of the disregard for contemporary movements and parties emanates from an unwillingness to recognize emotions and affect as part and parcel of any political subject, the visceral ties.