Economic sociology has argued and emphasized the importance of trust in market transactions since Weber’s and Simmel’s works. These two classical authors, and other more recent ones, especially those belonging to the 1980s, have maintained that market transactions may constitute a moral economy insofar as participants consider themselves committed, whether because they are convinced of it or on grounds of expediency, to a reciprocally correct behavior, and that the delimitation of economic relations within relatively close circles promotes trust relations or is a presupposition to them. On the other hand, some authors have also authoritatively maintained that a market open to new participants is the basis for the development of a generalized trust that disregards personal relations and requires, as a consequence, the commitment of as many participants in market exchanges as possible to exert a social control that may prevent and discourage opportunistic behaviors. This book has aimed, above all, to shed light on the thesis, originally formulated by Weber and Simmel, that exchanges are better ensured by a particular combination of restricted and generalized trust. In addition, this book has aimed at reconstructing ideal types of production organizations, and hence, intercorporate relations promoting this favorable combination of different kinds of trust; and finally, whether it prevails or not on a different combination, to show its consequences as regards its survival and achievement possibilities within the global market.