ABSTRACT

The chapter seeks to establish a workable framework in order to gauge the appropriateness of protection given to the manifestation of religious belief. In the first instance, it is necessary to outline the main precepts that are generally understood to be contained within this supreme principle, which is now identified as being Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). 1 There are many counter arguments that cast scepticism on this principle, which have been dealt with in great detail by Deryck Beyleveld, a latter day proponent of the PGC, along with Brownsword and Pattinson. 2 For example, objections have been made in respect of number of key areas: just what constitutes a moral principle, the role of human rights within the PGC, allegations that the voluntary nature described in the PGC is false, suppositions that the whole idea of agency is, itself, indefensible, lack of belief that an agent must regard purpose as a necessary good. 3 Rather than engaging in full defence of the PGC and addressing all these counter arguments, this chapter will explain why the PGC is being applied in this book and what is contained within the principle at its most relevant level.