Philosophers dissatisfied with their own arguments cannot always count on making do with the arguments of others. For in one very important sense Ryle's claim that a philosophical conclusion is never detachable from its premisses is indeed true. By subscribing to an alternative argument for his conclusion a philosopher can well find that he has unwittingly shifted his ground, perhaps even changed philosophical camps altogether. For example, as we shall see in the next chapter, if Ryle were to adopt Sartre's arguments for the conclusion that mental images are not objects, he would find himself stoutly defending a tradition he is explicitly out to demolish. But even to adopt the relatively simple terminological amendment proposed by Shorter would involve him in a fairly major shift in position. I think the move is clearly one he must make. Picturing is indeed, like depicting, a doing, and any theory of mental reference that denies this amount of parallel between them must be rejected.