ABSTRACT
In Chapter III we considered Ryle’s criticism of the Sense-datum Theory, and all we need do here is note how little it depends on linguistic grounds for what little validity it has. The first charge, that sensing sense-data is really observing sensations, which is absurd, was an Ignoratio Elenchi against the Sense-datum Theory, though valuable against those (chiefly neurologists) who talk of of perceiving sensations or percepts built of them. But its point lay in the non-linguistic criticism that the view involves an infinite regress or a faulty duplication of perceiving. The suggestion that sensations are not the sort of thing we can observe is of limited value, especially if based on considerations of language, for the physiologist might reply that if the plain man does not speak of perception or awareness of sensations it is merely because he has not studied the facts of the causation of perception; if he did study them he would see the necessity for this extension of the concept of sensation. The second charge, that we cannot observe looks or glimpses any more than we can eat nibbles, is linguistic or rather conceptual enough, but is an unnecessarily oblique way of indicating the main error of the theory, namely that it reifies look and appearance. The third, that the notion of incorrigible sensing is a confused apprehension of the task/achievement distinction, is at best only an explanation of error. Criticisms like those in my Chapter II must be developed to show the notion is in fact an error, and if my account is correct Ryle’s explanation is also faulty.
