Many philosophers would nowadays admit sympathy with Wittgenstein’s dictum that ‘All philosophy is “Critique of Language” and agree that the proper task (or at least an impor­ tant task) of the philosopher is the analysis of expressions to trans­ late them into less misleading forms or to clear up puzzles engen­ dered by their misunderstanding or misuse. It is notoriously difficult, however, to give any statement of this new approach which would be accepted by all concerned, for its exponents differ among themselves and are still developing their views as the result of mutual criticism, criticism and developments which are not always published. Moreover one can now distinguish two opposing trends. One view, more popular now in the United States of America than in Britain, is that ordinary language, or even the language of traditional philosophical discussion, is so irremediably confused that to use it in science or philosophy must inevitably lead to puzzlement or absurdity. One must therefore invent a new perfect language, which will reproduce the structure of the facts of the world better than do natural ones, and which will enable one to formulate and discuss the facts without ambiguity or error. The other view is that the fault lies not in ordinary or academic language but in our failure to understand its logic. Philosophers have created confusion or built up unsound meta­ physical edifices because they have used words incorrectly, have been misled by ordinary expressions, or have failed to appreciate the manifold functions of language. The remedy therefore is not to be found in artificial languages, which are chimerical and would present all the old puzzles when we tried to translate into them; rather we must examine our own language more carefully, and when we fully understand its logic and use we shall find the traditional problems dissolve away.