ABSTRACT
My main purpose in showing the various parallels between Marx and Wittgenstein has been to provide grounds for a resolution to the debate between objectivism and subjectivism. This program is largely predicated on the claim that this debate is in an important way deceptive. It is deceptive because despite the apparent gulf between these two perspectives, they are in fact both rooted in the same philosophical tradition: they are both in important measure dualist. That is, both objectivism and subjectivism represent different attempts to cope with the concept of mind as essentially private. Despite the very different responses to the problem of mind found in these perspectives, they both operate within a context framed by dualism. And this shared starting point is revealed by some important similarities in the kind of sociological knowledge ultimately produced within each orientation. My aim has thus been to show how, by rejecting dualism and what follows from it, the thought of Marx and Wittgenstein can provide an uniquely appropriate foundation for sociological thought.
