I N this chapter I propose to simplify the outlines of my thesis by stating it in terms which can act as a recapitulation and also as a sort of generalization of the method of resolving controversy which

it advocates. It is true that, the more general the terms in which the method is stated, the less specific are its recommendations, and hence the more these would have to be modified for maximum efficiency in each separate field of knowledge. But, for reasons which were outlined in Chapter I and which I hope are now persuasive, we can dismiss this as in itself no argument against a generalization. In any case there are independent arguments in favour. First, although I have already illus­ trated the application of the method to a number of particular problems, the object of such illustrations was rather to prove the efficacy of the method than to facilitate its use; so it was not presented in a form which is generally applicable. Secondly, if I am right in my argument, the method should have a wide range of use in fields I have had no space to examine. And thirdly (but again providing I am right in my argument), a great deal of time would be saved if those aspects of the method which can sensibly be treated as common to all reasoning were in fact so treated-as, for instance, I suggest in Chapter VII we should treat the problem of choosing the unit of enquiry. For then there would be no need for each scientist to work out the associated methodological prob­ lems separately, examining them at length as if they were special to his science-and often as if they were not methodological at all but factual.