It has become something of a tradition for ethical theorists to organize their efforts around one of three sets of concepts: value, obligation, or moral character-traits. The contention here will be that these three types of moral theory need to be co-ordinated, and that this co-ordination can be usefully accomplished in terms of a comprehensive set of justification procedures which has none of the partisan overtones of exclusively axiological, deontological, or agent-morality theories. It may bear reiteration for those philosophers irritated by arguments based on 'what one would want to say', that the point here is not that what we want to say has any special sort of authority. Metaphorical and analogical problems aside, the theorist's rejoinder ignores one additional constriction of a theoretic array of propositions. The truly pointed problem is how their co-ordination can most adequately respond to the needs which continually give rise to moral philosophy.