This chapter considers Germany’s position within the Atlantic order, particularly its relationship to the United States. The analysis is framed by the dynamic interaction of the geostrategic and geo-economic interests of the United States and Germany. The trajectory of the postwar order inexorably elevated Germany’s geostrategic importance to the United States, particularly with respect to its policy of containment. Germany’s geo-economic importance was the product of the ‘economic miracle’ of the 1950s in conjunction with the strategic over-extension of the United States, particularly in south-east Asia. The economic consequences of the US strategy of containment eventually manifested as the abandonment of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in 1973 and engendered conflicts between the United States and Germany on the management of the transatlantic economy and the distribution of the costs attending the defence of the West. The Cold War centrality that Germany enjoyed in US foreign policy calculations was challenged by the changed post-Cold War strategic context, the rising strategic and economic importance of China for the United States, and Germany’s continuing inability and unwillingness to assume a proportionately robust and responsible role in meeting the challenges posed by growing global disorder. This change in Germany’s salience to the United States can be traced to two bilateral factors: first, disagreements on macro-economic management after the collapse of the international financial system in 2008, conjoined to the parochialism of German economic statecraft when dealing with the eurozone debt crisis; and the highly caveated German participation in NATO out-of-area operations, which has shifted US attentions to France and Britain as America’s most important and dependable allies. The cumulative impact of these developments has been Germany’s relative decline as a key partner on many issues at the top of the American foreign policy agenda.