ABSTRACT
While violence was the tool of choice for the Russians in Chechnya and the government in Colombo, for the Philippine government it was an about-face after too liberal a use of force that marked a striking turnaround in counterinsurgent fortunes. Participation by an external power further distinguishes this campaign from those of the previous chapter. Neither Russia nor Sri Lanka sought or received outside assistance of lasting consequence to their subduing Chechen or Tamil insurgencies (the efforts of the Indian peacekeeping force in northern Sri Lanka notwithstanding). Understanding how the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) adapted to a lesser reliance on force provides reason enough for investigating its recent COIN activities. That and other elements behind its considerable progress also support five of our revised beliefs:
• COIN is not dead. • Democracy is not an inherent good. • Just because it has always been done that way does not mean it should
be done that way. • Treat militias like a hot stove. • Build more social and less physical infrastructure.
