ABSTRACT
This chapter reviews James’s treatment of sensation, perception, and conception, elucidating the relations among them, as “acquaintance with” objects of cognition is expanded into “knowledge about” them. Some potential confusion in James’s treatment of sensation is noted as is the fundamental nature of sensationalism in James’s thought. The source of meaning in the “transitive” parts of consciousness is underscored as are the multiple ways of describing the essences of “things.” Mention is also made of James’s claim that knowledge proceeds from the objective to the subjective rather than the usually claimed reverse. All along, the important role of human interests, needs, and selectivity in perception and conception is noted, and toward the end James’s argument about the sensational basis of the sense of time and space is explained. Reference is also made to James’s “direct realism,” its historical impact, and its relative independence of sensational specifics. The importance of perspectivism and of idealized representations of “things” is also treated.
