The remainder of the class of self-ascriptions is a part of the larger class of material body ascriptions. It is consequently a corollary to the position which holds there is something substantive to the first-person asymmetry that it be limited to a sub-class of the self-ascriptions. First, that self-ascriptive P-utterances are not a better ground for scepticism, not more problematic, than are first person M-utterances. P-predicates are said to be non-transferable in a way M-predicates are not. Some members of the M-list may be transferable. The author wants to hold, leaves P-discourse in as unproblematic a state as M-discourse, its necessary and usual contrast. What is secondarily suggested is that no credit is to be given arguments which make the capital out of such purported asymmetries, epistemic and otherwise, between one's personal and impersonal discourse. But the acceptance of some such asymmetry has been the history of the philosophy of mind.