From 1930 to 1993, monetary statecraft shaped Brazilian development fi rst by adjusting to global crisis through national populist strategies of import substitution industrialization (1930-1945), then as disputes between developmentalists and monetarists during postwar democracy that ended in military coup (1945-1964), then as orthodox adjustment and state-led fi nance under military rule (1964-1982) and, fi nally, by monetary chaos, inertial infl ation and anti-infl ation packages during the decade of transition from military rule (1983-1993). From 1930 to 1945, the Banco do Brasil remained the central agent for government policies of money, credit, fi nance, and foreign exchange designed to mobilize savings and channel resources toward industrialization and other development challenges. From 1945 to 1964, the politics of monetary policy embody the macroeconomics of populism controlled by a coalition centred in the Banco do Brasil that maintained prerogatives over money, credit and banking. 1 After the breakdown of democracy and military coup in 1964, orthodox reforms were fi rst imposed (1964-1967), but soon ceded to state-led development fi nanced by foreign capital infl ows (1968-1982). From 1983 to 1993, foreign debt and fi scal crisis were exacerbated by a ‘last dance syndrome’ during the political void caused by protracted transition whereby regional elites mismanaged state government banks and accelerated inertial infl ation. Six heterodox plans from 1986-1993 froze prices and wages but failed to control infl ation.