Kissinger did not share his department’s optimism. e regime change in Greece meant that Karamanlis, however conservative himself, had to govern democratically. at was equal, according to Kissinger’s thinking, to the ‘unleashing’ of le ist forces. His apocalyptic description probably re ected his estimate of the Portuguese precedent in April 1974. e problem from Kissinger’s perspective was that the littoral northern Mediterranean was in ux. It was not a matter of choice between military and civilian rule. His interpretation of events concerned the adverse e ects of political change on the Atlantic alliance and the security relationships Washington had built up since the 1940s. He was not sure of the outcome of the political process initiated in Greece. If a right-of-centre government emerged it would be ne. A le -of-centre one would vindicate his gloomy view that the US was not capable to in uence events. His main preoccupation was that the army was spent as a political force. e military had transferred power to a civilian government because it had failed and would not be in a position to in uence events before the lapse of some time. He predicted that the army was not even capable of pressing for the return of the King whom he thought now ine ective.2 It was obvious that Kissinger encountered with dismay the political bankruptcy of the army and the monarchy, institutions that used to oversee Greek politics in a manner compatible to American strategic priorities in Greece.