ABSTRACT
In this chapter, I will examine the extent to which the state has been restructured under each MEWA regime to create independent technocratic organisations, as well as the extent to which relationships and accountabilities have been formalised within the state in relation to MEWA frameworks. 1 New divisions have been created within the state in order to establish independent agencies to audit and monitor state activities under MEWA frameworks. These statutory organisations have been created in order to ‘legitimise markets’, ‘enhance trust’, to increase policy credibility and also to limit social risks in relation to particular steering measures under the regime, such as water planning measures and the purchase of water rights. 2 MEWA frameworks are also increasingly formalising roles, relationships, responsibilities and obligations under legislation, with the support of a compliance regime, 3 in order to strengthen the legitimacy of these regimes. 4 In legal terms, such codification is often analysed within the broad notion of ‘regime implementation’; however, regulatory capitalism focusses specifically on the way that transparency, accountability and social responsibility are embedded within regimes. 5 This chapter is devoted to examining these ‘codification’ measures under MEWA frameworks, and the role of independent agencies under the regimes. Delegation within the state and codification measures are most evident within the Murray-Darling Basin, where there has been the greatest reliance on new actors performing these roles. Alberta is positioned at the opposite end of the spectrum with very few checks and balances in terms of the accountability of actors for achieving environmental objectives under the regime.
