ABSTRACT
The Popular Front, incidentally, proved one of MAQI's rare successes in attempting to identify with the Arabs in Israel. Between July, 1958, and February, 1959, branches of the front were established in various towns and villages, chronologically as follows: Kafr Yasif, Taiyyba, \Vadi Nisnas, Ramie, Lydda, Bi'na, and others. Dedicated efforts were made to lend the front a character of mass support. Thus, large quantities of manifestoes were distributed, huge advertisements appeared, mass rallies were convened, and many Arab personalities were appealed to and invited to join. This activity was clearly aimed at making the Popular Front (as MAQI's organ put it) "The basis for uniting the ranks of the Arab people in Israel." 4 Actually, success was rather limited in this direction, as soon became apparent, both because of competition with other parties and groups and because many suspected that the Popular Front was a front organization for MAQI. Indeed, the honeymoon between the Communist and nationalist components of the Popular Front continued for not more than a year. Even this was achieved solely through a tacit agreement to avoid decisions concerning attitudes to foreign policy; and, on the contrary, to stress those internal problems on which agreement existed. \Vorking together proved relatively easy during this brief period, due also to the apparent identity of interests between 'Abd al-Nasir and the Soviet Union. However, when 'Abd al-Nasir attacked Syrian Communists "for endangering Arab unity" in a speech at Port Said at the end of 1958 and another early in 1959, the repercussions could be felt in the Popular Front as well. Furthermore, the 1959 conflict between 'Abd alNasir (the nationalist tendency) and Iraq's 'Abd al-Karim Qasim (whom
Moscow tended to support in this conflict) left the Popular Front badly shaken.
