For only the third time since the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia soon may have a new military doctrine.1 This document will once again attempt to clarify the military’s roles and missions, much as military doctrine in other states. But it will likely also do much more than that-it will set forth the circumstances under which the military instrument of Russia’s power and influence could be called upon to exert force. Traditionally, in many other parts of the world, military doctrine does not attempt to address the uppermost reaches of the national security strategy paradigm: world view, national interests and threats, primarily in the area of linking ends, ways, and means. Instead, it devotes itself to orienting military capabilities with national resources in support of political objectives. Because military doctrine in Russia derives in part from its Soviet past, at least in form, if not in substance, it represents more than just a road map of how to fight the nation’s wars. Russian military doctrine also specifies threats to national interests. In this case, the United States, NATO, and international terrorism are purportedly indicated by name, precisely in that order. According to an exclusive interview last September, published in the Russian language newspaper Gazeta, Sergei Ivanov, then Minister of Defense, gave details of the new document to journalists, calling it “more than just doctrine.”2 In fact, it may be more than the previous two iterations of doctrine in several key areas.