Unlike the genesis of time, the begetting of the world of sense appears not only in III.7(45).11-13, but several, somewhat conflicting accounts scattered across the expanse of the Enneads. In Porphyry’s chronology, most of these precede III.7(45), but a few are subsequent late treatises. All these need to be reduced to broad motifs and III.7(45).11 studied in their context. Soul’s making of the world of sense conforms largely to the poietic norms of Plotinian emanation – that a primary activity of the progenitor contemplates its prior while its secondary activity, iconic with respect to the first, flows downwards and generates a progeny – but with this key difference. Unlike the One and Intellect, which produce silently, without exteriorization – soul does not abide in itself. It declines and as Deck notes, soul’s declination comprises the projection of lower “parts” from itself – which serve to enform matter into bodies – such that the immobility of soul gets “compromised”. This compromise indicates a “relaxation” of the requirements of poiesis.1