ABSTRACT
This book analyzes the challenges of managing major military transformation. It asks
why and how some military organizations are more adept than others at reinventing
themselves, not just introducing but sustaining and honing revolutionary changes
in technologies, systems, doctrines, operations, and training. Why, for example,
did the British Army have difficulty marshalling early enthusiasm and advancing
initial innovations in tank warfare, while the German military leaped ahead with the
truly revolutionary Blitzkrieg strategy that pushed the technological and operational
frontiers for integrating tactical air power and mechanized warfare with devastating
effectiveness on the battlefield? How did the U.S. Navy excel at sustaining the
revolution at sea, steadily supplanting the “big gun” club that dominated the
service and transforming the aircraft carrier from an auxiliary spotter to the capital
ship by the end of World War II? By contrast, why did the U.S. Army resist new
demands for counterinsurgency, and how did it actively sabotage efforts to alter
the post-World War II bias towards a large-scale conventional warfare? This book
seeks to explain the variable patterns to which military services succeed and fail at
institutionalizing radically new approaches to warfare to inform efforts at managing
military transformation today.