These solutions are far from ideal. They are deeply fragile, only reinforcing the more structural problems associated with the Kenyan identification regime and leaving the regime in tact in ways that remain problematic for other communities that suffer similar problems (the Galje’el, for example). The Nubians’ experiences of this regime are illuminating of the great incentives in place for adherence to and reinforcement of the prevailing recognition and distribution regime. With few material resources and few connections to people with the capacity to address the issue head-on (CEMIRIDE and the Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa are the exceptions here), and understandably little faith that legal cases would necessarily make much difference anyway, it is not difficult to comprehend why the Nubians would instead seek to carve out a space for themselves within this regime to address the short term and immediate problem of ID cards for their youth. In the next two chapters I further explore the nature of the recognition and distribution regime that underpins the Nubian’s problems with ID cards, and further analyse the ways in which the Nubians’ strategies for remedying their citizenship deficits do more to reinforce the existing regime than transform it.