ABSTRACT

In discussions with central Norwegian civilian actors after the Norwegian PRT withdrawal from Faryab province and regarding the success or failure of the Norwegian model, it was claimed that the Norwegian model clearly functioned well. The Norwegian military (who made up the largest part of the PRT staff) left Faryab province cleanly, without having to tie up loose ends with any short or medium term projects that may or may not have been successful, unlike what the British PRT was experiencing, it was claimed (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007-2010b). As such, the clear divide between military and civilian actors was considered a success. In the discussion where the above comments were made, civil-military interaction was tightly linked to the COIN doctrine, and tied to an argument that COIN did not, in the end, appear to work. It was stated that Norwegian military actors demonstrated a loyalty to the Norwegian model rather than to the COIN doctrine, resulting in a successful withdrawal from their area of responsibility. It was also claimed that basic “after operation” considerations were well enough addressed during operations (battle reparations), and the idea that any other efforts would be necessary after the operation (in the COIN doctrine referred to as “hold” and “build” phases of the operation) was in fact wrong. The problem was that militaries, in particularly foreign militaries, would never be able to “win” the hearts of local populations no matter what they did after the operation, therefore the value of following up after the kinetic phase of an operation was limited if not counterproductive.