Before turning directly to ascertaining how metaphysical judgments can be verified, there is something else which Kant first investigates. Since knowledge of any sort can only be got by connecting concepts into judgments, metaphysics in particular can only obtain knowledge by connecting concepts into judgments. When I pick up an object before me and judge that it is red, or that it is smooth, or that it is a book, in making these judgments I avail myself of the concepts of red, smooth, book. These concepts are derived from observation and the judgments by which I ascribe them are verified by recourse to observation. Metaphysics, however, seeks a knowledge of things generally. If metaphysics is to get such knowledge, it requires concepts by which to think what holds of things generally. Before inquiring how metaphysical judgments can be verified, Kant therefore inquires what concepts are available to metaphysics, out of which to form judgments.1