The cases discussed in this book show that situation structure can adequately explain most, yet not all, institutional changes in the genetic resources regime complex. As such, it offers a broader theoretical perspective than either interplay management or regime shifting. Both of the latter can partially explain different aspects of institutional change in ABS—yet the question is why, at times, institutional outcomes can be explained in terms of the former and at other times in terms of the latter. Why would governments engage in interplay management, say, in regards to the relationship of the Seed Treaty, the CBD and the CGIAR, yet opt for inconsistency in regards to the relationship between the Treaty’s article 12.3(d) and the patent regime? If article 12.3(d) is a counter-regime norm directed towards patents, why does article 13.2(d)(iv) accept patent claims under the condition that benefits are shared? If Farmers’ Rights were intended to balance the illegitimate appropriation of PGRFA by a handful of multinational seed companies and research institutes, why did the participants to the International Undertaking adopt the Farmers’ Rights amendment at the same time as they conceded the Undertaking’s compatibility with plant-variety rights? And why did they surrender large parts of their bargaining position on Farmers’ Rights before the negotiations on the Seed Treaty were even picking up pace?