We noted that Boscovich describes a theory which is very similar to the one defended by Nietzsche. However, he also offers what is intended to be a refutation of it, giving two reasons for judging the argument to be invalid. The first is an objection to any argument which relies on the concept of chance. Since everything has a cause, he claims, those who use such arguments ‘err in the fact that they consider that there is anything that is in itself truly fortuitous’. 1 For we use the word ‘chance’ only when we are ignorant of the cause of something, and so it is an empty expression. The same objection is sometimes raised against Nietzsche, on an assumption that his argument depends on both probability and determinism in reaching its conclusion. As we saw in the last chapter, however, the objection is mistaken in two ways: Nietzsche’s argument does not rely on any use of probability and, in any case, would not be chargeable with inconsistency if it did. These points need not be repeated now.