The previous chapter has provided us with a point of departure for a phenomenology of plurality. It has mapped out the context in which the concern for plurality emerged, combining a critique of classical phenomenological positions with a new approach to the realm of human affairs. This has prepared the way for switching to a perspective that now extracts the core phenomenon of plurality and its paradigmatic structure from Arendt’s work. In short, this phenomenon can be described as actualizing plurality in a space of appearances. It is given, as we can already see, as an intersubjective experience. Hence, it is important to note that it does not primarily describe a concept (as if Arendt had “discovered” the “concept of plurality”), but something that happens in a verbal sense like an activity, e.g. the activity of dancing or conducting a conversation. The German word “Vollzug,” which Arendt often uses in this context and which belongs also to the main vocabulary of Heideggerian phenomenology, expresses precisely this enactive quality in contrast to a static and substantive indication like “house” or “stone.” Furthermore, it is crucial to take into account that actualizing plurality is a contingent, non-necessary event. It can just as well not happen or even be actively inhibited. The state of actualized plurality is thus always faced with the specter of it sliding back into mere possibility. Beyond that, it is severely threatened by those who seek to destroy even this possibility.