ABSTRACT
Taking a propositional attitude is not, in primitive cases, an action. A child is capable of believing, wishing and intending if he has developed sufficiently (1) to wish for an end, say to relieve an unpleasant feeling in his arms; (2) to form beliefs, such as that stretching them will relieve that feeling, and that he can stretch them; and (3), given no other wish he believes will be frustrated if he stretches them, to intend to stretch them. And the result of his so wishing, believing and intending will be that he does stretch them, if he is right in believing that he can. At this early stage of his development, his wishing, believing and intending are not in turn explained by further wishes, beliefs and intentions; for, since he has as yet no concepts of wishing, believing or intending, he cannot think about his wishes, beliefs and intentions at all.
