Kant believed that authentic, moral religion is a vehicle for practical morality that could appeal to finite and fragile human agents so as to strengthen their moral resolve. The overt moral dimension of Kant’s discussion of religion was interpreted in the early 19th century as a reduction of religion to certain morally beneficial functions. The standard objections that were raised were threefold. First, Kant would have mistakenly underestimated the historical dimension of faith by focusing merely on its transcendental, ahistorical function. Second, Kant would have mitigated the uniqueness of Christianity by rendering its beliefs and creeds replaceable moral symbols—especially Kant’s Christology in Religion II was a stumbling block, not least to the theological censor! Finally, Kant would have underestimated the importance of God’s volition (creation and incarnation) by including God merely as a focus imaginarius to architectonically self-enclose the system of practical reason. 1 While initially Hegel’s philosophy was believed to remedy these difficulties, theologians soon became dissatisfied with Hegel’s philosophy of religion as well—especially Schelling’s Berlin lectures (1840 onwards) proved of great importance. 2