One reason that the U.S. was willing to escalate involvement in Vietnam was the increasing success of the insurgency in the south. 1 The National Liberation Front (NLF) and Viet Cong (VC) were being supplied by the North Vietnamese communists, and without U.S. assistance South Vietnam would fall; it was inevitable. South Vietnamese ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) forces had lost a small encounter at Ap Bac, an indication of the need for U.S. men and materiel. But the U.S. and the ARVN were having a tough time getting the VC to fight fair. The U.S. preferred a stand-up fight in the open, using heavy artillery, air support, and conventional forces, and that is how they trained the ARVN to fight as well. The VC could count on numbers and small arms fire, but did not have the conventional capabilities of the U.S. or ARVN. Thus, the VC would attack, then retreat, like they had learned from the Viet Minh. They were very careful to choose their targets and battles; they preferred hit-and-run insurgency tactics. The VC would attack villages in remote areas, looking for support and safe haven. When the U.S. and ARVN counter-attacked, the VC would fade into the jungle and hide. The American use of firepower was often counter-productive; the locals turned against the Americans and ARVN when they burned villages and ravaged farms. After the Americans returned to their bases, the VC would reinfiltrate the villages. Westmoreland and Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV) wanted to find and fix the VC in conventional battles, but could not entice them to fight. The U.S. forces wanted a war of annihilation; the VC only offered a war of attrition.