Between the mid-1970s and the end of the following decade a system of corruption existed within the ATM, Milan's public transport company, so extensive and well- rooted (the magistrates were able to document over two thousand illegal transactions) that not a single denunciation or internal controversy disturbed its functioning. A double division of roles seems to have operated among the corrupt ATM functionaries, partly based on office held, partly on internal agreements. One division was between organizers and "cashiers," the other between material participants and those who simply turned a blind eye (and were paid for so doing). The head of the purchasing department would appear to have specialized in making contacts with businessmen and bringing the practice of illegality to their attention: "[B]y then he had become quite able in adopting this or that tone, persuasive and kind or arrogant and imperious, according to the cultural and social characteristics of the person with whom he was talking. Sometimes he would be courteous, sometimes threatening, whichever appeared most likely to be productive in view of the personality of the other party. " On different occasions, to different entrepreneurs he had "stated things clearly, demanding the sum owed" "said he was obliged to give something to the party " "put the alternative: either pay the money or find it impossible to get on with the work in peace," "did not ask openly but made it understood that it would be opportune...," "asked that he be able to see to expenses and gifts," "suggested going along with what the other companies did already," "imposed his conditions with the threat of receiving no more contracts," "made it understood that it would be opportune to look good in the eyes of those who had appointed him," "merely asked his commission," and "made it clear that it was necessary to give money to the parties" (TAM:44). Another functionary was responsible for collecting small-scale bribes, a task that would have distracted the chief "cashier" from his other duties. Before distribution, the illegal proceeds of corruption were held in a common fund, indicative of the very high levels of trust among those involved. Another of the functionaries admitted that his task within the division of labor was the distribution of information to firms, in particular giving "favored competitors a list of the other firms competing so that they could contact each other and agree on the price to be submitted to the purchaser" (TAM:44).