With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a status quo in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an agreement will slowly disappear among Germanophile British politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arises: Will Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate camps and will they march against each other one day? ... Peace or war between England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France . . . . It follows therefore that war between Germany and England ... can be prevented only if France knows from the start that England's forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby France, to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-France coalition would never tolerate. (Memorandum to Hitler from an apparently highplaced source, January 2, 1938; cited in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression.)

1112. This position would arise for instance if England, through insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by a superior coalition of powers, e.g., Germany, Italy, Japan, thereby tying down her military forces in other places, would not be able to assure France her sufficient support in ... Europe. (Ibid.)

1113. Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us, 1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard to the protection

lition against England, that is to say, tightening of our friendship with Italy and


Japan; also the winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours directly or indirectly.