In the previous chapter I argued that an agent who acts so as to do what consequentialism requires her to do cannot also meet the demands of friendship. A defender of consequentialism might admit this, but deny that it grounds an objection to consequentialism. After all, it might be argued, other things matter to us besides morality. If an agent finds herself unable to achieve certain goods or participate in certain relationships as a result of her commitments to morality, it may be the fault of the agent rather than the fault of her moral theory. It might be, that is, that she is taking her moral commitments too seriously, or carrying them too far, and thus failing to accord proper significance to her nonmoral reasons for action. Morality, this argument reminds us, is not meant as a comprehensive guide to conduct; so it is no objection to a given moral theory that an agent who lived by it and ignored all other considerations might as a result find her life to be lacking in certain important values.