There are many ways of conceptualizing constitutional identity. Legally one is reconciled with the idea of characterizing constitutional identity in terms of core legal principles on which a country’s Constitution is based. Apparently, this is fair since a Constitution is primarily a compilation of legally articulated provisions, and a legal reading of these enactments reveals their nature and also texture. So, for legal-constitutionalists, it does not seem to be a hard task because an appropriate legal reading of the constitutional provisions is the best option to follow to conceptualize constitutional identity. This is legalistic and does not seem to be confusing since constitutional identity is conceptualized in terms of the letters of the Constitution. One of the serious limitations of such a conceptualization stems from the charges that exclusive legalistic understanding of a Constitution will hardly help us comprehend the true nature of a Constitution which is also interwoven with how it is politico-ideologically construed. As is commonly understood, a Constitution, despite being just a collection of rules and regulations, is also political in the sense that it evolves in a set of power-relationships which hardly remain static. And, that Constitution is the best that passes through the test of time which means that it adapts itself with the changing socio-economic and political milieu without compromising on the fundamental politico-ideological values, mores and principles from which it derives its sustenance. Significant here is a claim that for an appropriate understanding of constitutional identity, one needs to be sensitive to the context in which it evolves. It is a matter of common sense that liberal constitutionalism develops in a milieu in which constitutional liberalism is privileged. What it defends is the conceptualization that constitutional identity is primarily a context-driven phenomenon which further confirms that a mere legal articulation of the constitutional provisions can neither be illuminating nor ideologically perceptive for being highly restrictive, both in its nature and meaning. This is an obvious and logic-driven articulation of a conceptualization; there is no scope for confusion. Different circumstances, however, emerge if contrary positions are justified which is always the case if the constitutional values fail to make inroads in a society in which it evolves. Implicit here are two complementary arguments: on the one hand, it makes 205the point that mere codification of laws by drawing upon the Enlightenment values and principles does not, by itself, ensure their ready acceptance by the people; one needs to inculcate a mindset in their support which is a long-drawn process. There is also the point, on the other, that a mindset, once evolved, will automatically ensure the continuity of the Constitution based on the aspired politico-ideological preferences. What is required is also to create and consolidate a politico-cultural milieu to strengthen those priorities which are consciously chosen by the demos to fulfil what they deem appropriate for their future. Basic here is the point that constitutional identity does not emerge naturally, but is constructed keeping in view the exalted values and principles complementary to what a specific multitude of people considers appropriate for attaining specific politico-ideological goals.