ABSTRACT
In an article in the American Political Science Review, John Wright (1990) uses multiple regression analysis to test a set of hypotheses about the factors influencing the extent to which members of the U.S. House of Representatives are lobbied by interest groups. (Recall that lobbying refers to attempts by individuals and groups to influence government officials.) The issue Wright studies for this analysis is the consideration of the reauthorization of the 1980 legislation, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (i.e., the “Superfund”), by the 36 members of the House Ways and Means Committee in 1985. Specifically, he focuses on lobbying activity directed at the committee concerning the question of “who would pay for hazardous waste cleanup…. [This] question split the business community between oil and chemical producers [… which favored a broad-based tax], and a broad base of general businesses on the other hand [… which supported a] plan to concentrate the tax burden on the oil and chemical industry” (p. 420).
