Liberal claims, such as Nader’s, about the failure of ordinary practical intelligence are in principle easy to evaluate. We can readily see the failing alleged and the behavior that would correct or avoid it, so verifying the liberal’s claim is a fairly straightforward empirical matter. The incompleteness claim—that the individual in his own right is radically incomplete—the most fundamental of the four principles of basic liberalism—is not so easy to grasp. When we are told that a person is helpless in practical matters, we can demand to know specifically what he can’t do. The idea of helplessness immediately suggests tasks, specific acts, projects and specific failures. When it is suggested that the individual is basically incomplete, we are confronted by a notion more amorphous than helplessness and the claims that incorporate the idea are less open to immediate cross-examination. What in particular does the “incomplete” individual lack? We are not told, although we are given to understand that because he lacks it he does not have certain powers or abilities it’s desirable for him to have in order that he live a worthwhile life or that his life be better some way. This brings us back to helplessness, however. Whatever incompleteness may consist of, its significance is helplessness. Because the individual is incomplete, he is helpless; helplessness is a behavioral or experiential manifestation of incompleteness. There is this difference: incompleteness is a more profound condition than helplessness in practical affairs. Incompleteness cannot be cured by regulating auto manufacturers or outlawing annoying advertising, but only by means of “solidarity,” joining with others in “community.” I will use ‘helplessness’ as a generic term. It will mean disability or incapacity in practical affairs or the deeper condition of incompleteness, depending on our context.