After reviewing and discussing some salient examples that have been taken to motivate epistemic relativism, in this chapter, we turn to the discussion of how best to make sense of epistemic relativism itself. That is, we will consider how best to formulate this variety of relativism. This exercise is not pre-empted by the critical outcome of the discussions of Chapter 7 for, even if we have found no real-life cases of disputes about justification that could lead to epistemic relativism, we still would like to know how best to make sense of that idea. After all, philosophy is not an empirical discipline, and many positions developed within it can be tested not just in terms of their empirical adequacy but also in terms of their adequacy de jure. In the rest of the chapter, we will therefore consider two influential models for framing the arguments for epistemic relativism: the replacement model, formulated by Paul Boghossian and further developed by Martin Kusch, and truth-relativism in the epistemic domain, owed to John MacFarlane.