ABSTRACT
The First Amendment speaks in strikingly absolute terms: “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” The Supreme Court’s interpretation of these guarantees has been both broader and narrower than a literal reading of the amendment might suggest. The Court has ruled that the amendment protects channels of communication other than speech and press, including those such as television and the Internet invented since the amendment’s adoption. It has also extended some protection to actions undertaken with communicative intent such as political demonstrations and symbolic acts, even if they do not involve speech. Acknowledging that “effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association,” the Court recognized in NAACP v. Alabama (1958) a First Amendment right to freedom of association for expressive purposes. Most important, in Gitlow v. New York (1925) and Near v. Minnesota (1931), the justices ruled that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment’s restrictions likewise apply to state regulations of speech and of the press. In fact, most free speech cases have involved challenges to state or local enactments.
