This chapter titled Beyond Internalism-Externalism covers the concept of mind and world interface from the semantic and phenomenological outlooks. The core concern of the book is to go beyond the ongoing debate of Internalism versus Externalism by revisiting the phrases of ontology towards semantic by passing through phenomenology. The chapter revisits the phenomenological move, a mode to look at the mind-world intermingleness in Husselian sense. This section exclusively not only aims to introduce the methodological standpoint of phenomenological reductionism, but renovates the linguistic idiom of an act, a hypothesis that collapses an act of consciousness with an object of consciousness by synchronizing a ‘synthetic structure’. The key problem with which this chapter ensued is whether does thought precede language or thought passably relies on the propositional structure. This appraisal offers integrity to the linkage between the mind and the world and intends to go beyond it by introducing the conception of thought. Thoughts in the form of propositional attitudes are no doubt representational in the sense of mental act of the subject but the content of this mind-based representation becomes world oriented (objective centric) in our linguistic communication. Thought has an exposition of causal referential directness to the world by mesmerizing the conceptual schemata of the thinker.