The chapter (Comeback to Phenomenology from Language) move towards a phenomenological stance to show that phenomenological methods are not confined into the boundary of the subjective entangling with intentionality, and external phenomenon etc., but its paradigmatic loom towards language scrawls down the subjectivity by ensnaring to the linguistic world. Husserl is the foremost philosopher who extracts the concept of psychologism to articulate the ‘theory of meaning’ by bringing the idea of meaning, mental content and the mind-world liaison in phenomenology. The query sounds promising whether Husserl is representationalist or non-representationalist? Husserl’s theory of meaning has taken a linguistic turn in the world of phenomenology since he believes that the meaning firstly ties to the linguistic expression that may adept to referring the referent. Being a follower of the opinion ‘all mental acts has their correlative noemeta or senses’, Husserl persists a crucial distinction with Frege as he espouses the model of ‘noema’ or Sinn that could be can be linguistically expressible. Another issue that looks impressive is doubtlessly the way where Husserl urges that consciousness as an immanent being escorts towards the intentional acts, while Heidegger ponders on the factual inside of the being that patiently delimited with the external world. The analyses of Husserl and Heidegger wrap up a mind-world interrelationship, which could be viable because of the subject-object concurrence. This chapter depicts an intersubjective turn by assimilating the Husserlean idea of ‘life world’ and Heidegger’s ‘Being-in-the-world’ hypotheses to illumine the mind-world entanglement.