The three case studies from Chapter 3 make the point that the success of the Green Revolution was dependent on a clear policy framework in which land reform with a focus on the peasant farmer was a central element. Many of the complementary policies to support the uptake of Green Revolution technologies were not only absent, but actively discouraged by often contradictory and ideologically driven foreign aid policies of the West (Blackden and Morris-Hughes 1993; Fonchingong 1999; Koehler 2015). A key policy of structural adjustment was to reduce the size of government, which meant cutting state expenditure on supporting rural infrastructure such as roads, marketing services, and agricultural extension, which as we have seen, is necessary for the successful uptake of many if not most Green Revolution technologies. In the 1980s there was a move to a farming systems approach to agricultural research which was redolent of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century approaches (Harwood 2012). But this was at odds with prevailing neo-liberal policy and approaches promoted by the World Bank and many Western donors. These favoured reduced government investment in agricultural support services, cash crop production for export, and larger commercial farms. The search for the ‘quick fix’ rather than the long term payoff of a farming systems approach resulted in the waning of donor interest in the Green Revolution.