ABSTRACT

However his subjects may have felt about the truce with France, the king of England himself must have heaved a sigh of rdief when it was signed, though the common belief in France that Edward was indolent and less eager for war than his subjects 1 was probably unwarranted. It is not likely that the man who had fought and won the battles of Barnet and Tewkesbury had lost all his martial spirit in two years, and Edward had excellent reasons for feeling that the present moment was no time to commit his kingdom to the care of a regent while he crossed the sea for any enterprise however glorious. For one thing, he was still not quite sure of the Scots, and so obvious was it that he ought not to leave home before his northern border had been made entirely secure from attack that the Duke of Burgundy sent a couple of ambassadors, Fulpard de Amerongen and Georges Baert, to Scotland by way of England to see what could be done to bring James III to terms. But though Charles prevailed on James to renew his truce with England until 10th April, 1475, and also to agree that there should be another conference of English and Scottish commissioners at Alnwick on 16th June, this was hardly enough, and Edward’s efforts to obtain a treaty of peace and a marriage alliance with James continued to be unavailing. 2 At this very time, moreover, as Edward and Charles probably suspected, if they did not actually know, some Scottish ambassadors who had gone to France were not merely assuring Louis that James had rejected all Edward’s proposals, but were offering to find means to prevent the English from landing in France. James shared the belief that Edward was less anxious than his subjects to attempt to recover England’s lost possessions beyond sea, and for the sum of ten thousand crowns he 54offered to keep Edward at home, by attacking him, if that proved to be necessary, or by promising to protect him against his subjects should they rise in revolt when he gave up his expedition to France and disbanded his army. 1