Triggered by the oil boom and policies of infitah, of which Sadat's is the most well known but by no means only example, dramatic change over the past fifteen years has affected the political economies of most Arab countries. With regard to the impact on class structures, it has been widely observed that an infitah bourgeoisie has emerged as the most powerful social force in domestic economies and political systems. What remains in question is how cohesive that class is and whether it has succeeded in rendering the state subservient to it. The general weight of expert opinion on Egypt is that the infitah bourgeoisie has emerged from the coalescence of segments of the bourgeoisie that previously were isolated or antagonistic and through the mobilization of altogether new elements. These fragments that together constitute the infitah bourgeoisie include leftovers from the ancien regime, those who had been "sitting out" Nasserism in the West or the Gulf, members of Nasser's "new class" of managers and technocrats who established linkages to the private sector, upwardly mobile financial wizards who successfully rode the roller coaster propelled by the fast money of the infitah, and various other smaller components. Not surprisingly, as the infitah has lost its steam due to disenchantment with its excesses, falling oil prices, and global recession, factionalization of this class has become evident, suggesting that the fragments of which it was said to be composed may never have merged as thoroughly as was previously thought. The diversity of the larger category of the bourgeoisie will be illustrated in this chapter, and an attempt will be made to demonstrate that the true infitah bourgeoisie, which is more accurately termed parasitic, is not currently nor was it previously homogeneous.