(A) Language.—The structure of common usage (191) implies many philosophical opinions, which are likely to be correct because they are consistent with each other and very general in character. C. W. holds that they are likely to be correct (194) on the grounds that they are not the result of theories, and have arisen in close contact with the facts. He habitually considers the usage bearing on a problem (196), and commonly accepts its implication. He implies (198) that, before we reject it, we must be sure we understand it, can do without it, and know how it arose. He holds that many philosophical errors arise from neglecting grammar or confusing it with philosophy, and that we are prone to assume that words have a single meaning, whereas they often refer to a plurality of entities which, while closely related to each other, are not species of a single genus, cf. ‘thinking ‘and ‘truth’ (203). He holds (205) that technical philosophical terms are more likely to be wrong than ordinary usage, and is extremely chary of them himself (209).