ABSTRACT
Mexico’s authoritarian-corporatist structure and the high concentration of power that was vested in the presidency during the PRI’s period of traditional rule resulted in a highly exclusionary, top-down decision and policymaking style of governing, in which the president and a small group of advisors had significant control over policy direction. Despite the process of political liberalization and the rise of large-scale social mobilization that unfolded during the 1980s and early 1990s, there was, paradoxically, a strengthening of presidentialism as policymaking became even more exclusionary. During both the de la Madrid and Salinas administrations, the presidents’ inner circles became narrower and policy came to be formulated by a handful of individuals belonging to their camarillas. The measures that de la Madrid started to implement, and that Salinas intensified, to weaken the traditional corporatist structure, translated into the exclusion of some groups (i.e. organized labor) that had previously influenced policy direction. Policymaking became thus more endogenous as it did not incorporate demands from outside that small circle and the public policy agenda was thus mostly set by the President and his close advisors.1
