As far as its ambigui ty is concerned (E) claims either: in cm assertoric context in which an assertion is made, 2 that a speaker's speech-act of saying of a sentence x that it is t rue and her speech-act of just ut ter ing the sentence x (to assert x or to claim the t ru th of x) mean the same; or, in a non-assertoric context, that the two speech-acts have the same il locutionary force. (It is noted that , in such contexts, two speech-acts that have the same locutionary meaning - a meaning which does not depend on whether or not the t ru th predicate is used to give a description or make a s tatement - may have different illocutionary func t ions - funct ions which do depend on whether or not the truth predicate is used to serve some illocutionary purpose.)3 In the former case, (E) would be elaborated into the following Frege-Ramsey-style meaningequivalence thesis (Frege 1892: 64; Ramsey 1927: 16-17):

(FR) One's claim that p is t rue means no more than what one's ut terance p means;

or more accurately,

(M) For any ut terance p tha t a person X unders tands , her claim that p is t rue means (for X) the same as her assertion p.