The book introduced the notion of ghost coalitions to explain policymaking in a highly fragmented presidential democracy. When democratic governments lack a party majority in the legislature, it is common practice that the president or prime minister would craft power-sharing agreements with the opposition in order to advance their policy agenda. These agreements are normally secured by offering cabinet positions, policy concessions, or particularistic incentives to opposition parties. But the coalition currencies that helped ensure coalitional trust in other fragmented settings (Alston et al. 2008) were simply not available or were publicly regarded as corrupt transactions in Ecuador. This absence of power-sharing incentives confronted policymakers with a cooperation dilemma. Presidents and legislators could mutually benefi t from making political transactions, but they faced high reputational costs, which undermined their willingness to cooperate with one another. Unless, of course, they could fi nd an alternative and effective way to trade votes and favors.