The more intensive and protracted war became, the more the adversaries’ sustainability over a long period of time came to depend on their national power in general. It was against this backdrop that nineteenth and twentieth century military thinkers linked the efficiency of military operations with the degree of success in rallying the economic, industrial and other resources of the nation in support of the army. Two sea power strategists, Julian Corbett and Alfred T. Mahan, stressed the material dimension in their maritime theory.1 J.F.C. Fuller referred to logistics not merely as a military factor but also as a national endeavor, pointing to the flow of rear resources to the frontline as one of the important conditions for battlefield success.2 Other twentieth-century thinkers called for “squaring the [Clausewitzian] triangle” by adding technology and economy to Clausewitz’s non-material three dimensions of war (the government, the military and the people),3 due to the role played by the material dimension in modern war and strategy.4